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ABSTRACT
Analyzing The Growing Islamic Radicalization in France
Islamic radicalization in European countries is becoming more and more
prevalent, as evidenced by the number of recent attacks by Muslims in Europe. I argue
that the social, religious, and psychological environment in France creates a unique
opportunity for Islamic radicalization, particularly through social media and in prisons.
After defining radicalization and explaining two radicalization processes as well as
different types of radicals, I analyze the specific factors present in France that contribute
to this radicalization. I use case study analysis to examine several French citizens who
radicalized, either online or in prison, in order to show how the recruiter exacerbated the
situation in France. Additionally, I evaluate primary sources from the Islamic State and
the Levant, in order to show how it capitalizes on certain aspects of French society, such
as the discriminatory laws banning the burka. I also apply both theories of radicalization,
and analyze which one matches the processes found in the case studies and primary
sources. My findings support my hypothesis that France is a unique case where Islamic
radicalization is more easily achieved, and that the presence of a mentor is crucial in the
radicalization process.
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Introduction
My thesis is about the torturous relationship that France has with its Muslim
citizens. This thesis seeks to answer the question: why does France have particularly
difficult relationship with its citizens of Muslim faith, sometimes resulting in Islamic
radicalization? To answer this question, I explore recruitment pertaining to social media
and in prisons. Based upon my case study analysis, I hypothesize all Muslims in France
are discriminated against by state laws, but that social media and prison serve as a tipping
point environment in which Muslims become radicalized. I also hypothesize that the
presence of a mentor is crucial in the radicalization process in both instances. To test
these hypotheses, I examine two case studies as well as primary sources from radical
Islamic groups.
France experienced unprecedented international terrorist attacks in the 1980s,
beginning with the Rue Copernic attack.1, 2 France’s experiences with widespread Islamic
terrorism, though, began in the 1990s as a spillover from the civil war between Algeria
and Le Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA), the most radical Islamic group in Algeria.3 French

1

Jeremy Shapiro and Benedicte Suzan, “The French experience of counterterrorism,” Survival 45:1 (Spring
2003), 71.
2
The Rue Copernic attack was a terrorist attack on 3 October 1980 in an affluent neighborhood in Paris. A
bomb originating from a motorbike’s saddlebags exploded, killing four people and wounding 11. It was the
sixth attack on a Jewish target that week, and authorities blamed neo-Nazis for the attack. They later
discovered that the perpetrators of all of the attacks were Middle Eastern terrorists, thus marking the
beginning of a wave of attacks in France by foreign terrorists.
3
Frank Foley, Countering Terrorism in Britain and France (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2013), 282.
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officials began noticing an influx of members of Algerian Islamic groups into France in
1992.4 These attacks have shaped French counter-terrorism efforts over the past 30 years.
This research project was completed during the intense civil war occurring in
Syria, with many rebel groups and outside actors competing for territory and the right to
rule. In 2015, France received the second largest number of asylum applications, and the
refugee population continues to grow.5 My goal going into this project was to understand
why Muslims in France seem to choose a radical violent path more often than in other
countries around the world. The Charlie Hebdo attacks in January 2015, the November
2015 Paris attacks, and even other attacks in Europe, such as the March 2016 Brussels
attack, make this research timely and relevant. The rise of the Islamic State and the
Levant (ISIL) and its recruitment tactics will revolutionize how extremist groups operate,
especially in countries with a large amount of discriminations against Muslims, like
France.6 Sebastian Rotella, an investigative journalist, highlights the importance of
Western extremists by stating, “Extremists of European descent worry police for the
same reason that Al Qaeda prizes them: their symbolic value, their Western passports and
their fanaticism.”7 As the influx of refugees increases, this anxiety on the part of police
towards Muslims will continue to grow, potentially leading to more radicalization. The
combination of French laws, the large Muslim population in France, and increased efforts
to crackdown on terrorism creates an environment conducive to radicalization.

4

Shapiro and Suzan, “The French experience of counterterrorism,” 80.
“2015 UNHCR subregional operations profile - Northern, Western, Central and Southern Europe,” The
UN Refugee Agency, June 2015, http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e48e571e.html.
6
The Islamic State and the Levant (ISIL) is also known as the Islamic State in Syria (ISIS), Daesh, and the
Islamic State (IS). It is a Salafi jihadist militant group that follows an Islamic fundamentalist Wahhabi
doctrine of Sunni Islam.
7
Sebastian Rotella, “Al Qaeda’s Stealth Weapons,” Los Angeles Times, September 20, 2003, accessed
October 28, 2015, http://articles.latimes.com/2003/sep/20/world/fg-converts20.
5
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I use case study analysis and examples of Islamic terrorist propaganda to explore
who is susceptible to Islamic radicalization in France, as well as how this process begins
through social media and in prisons. In France, social media and prisons are both tipping
points for the radicalization process. Muslims can easily connect with radical groups via
social media, and serving time in prison provides a catalyst for radicalization. Case
studies are an “appropriate way to answer broad research questions, by providing us with
a thorough understanding of how the process develops in this case.”8 To analyze how
social media is used for radical Islam recruitment, I study the case of Anna Erelle in In
the Skin of a Jihadist. This is an autobiography detailing an undercover French
journalist’s experience being recruited to ISIL through Facebook and Skype by a young
man named Bilel, who in reality was Rachid X, the French fighter closest to Abu Bakr alBaghdadi.9 I also analyze ISIL’s publications and recruitment methods. Examining the
lives and radicalization processes of Amedy Coulibaly and Chérif Kouachi serve as the
case studies for how the process works in French prisons. I study Karim Mokhtari, a man
who was approached while in prison to convert to radical Islam, but did not.
Additionally, I apply two different radicalization processes to each of these case studies
and publications to determine which one recruiters use in France.
It is important to note what this thesis will not address. It does not address any
type of extremism other than Islamic extremism in France. Although separatist groups in
France often commit terrorist acts, studying Islamic extremism is more important at this
time due to its rapidly expanding networks. It does not seek to create a profile of a
terrorist. Anyone can be susceptible to radical ideology; this is why it can be so hard to
8

Peter Swanborn, Case Study Research: What, Why and How? (New York: Sage Publications Ltd, 2010),
3.
9
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi is the head of ISIL’s militant group.
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detect. Today’s terrorists “challenge many of the stereotypes that were held about who
becomes a terrorist and why… they represent a diverse collection of individuals, fitting
no single demographic profile, nor do they all follow a typical pathway to violent
extremism.”10 This thesis analyzes how al-Qaeda and ISIL recruit those living in France,
and posits that other extremist groups will use these recruitment methods in the future.
In the first chapter, I explain what radicalization is. Understanding this term is
imperative in order to comprehend the current situation in France. The process of
radicalization, though there are several different models, needs to be explored and
defined. I analyze two separate models of the radicalization process. I also explain
different types of radicals and give examples specific to France in this chapter. The
second chapter explores the psychological, religious, and social factors that contribute to
Islamic radicalization in France. Social scientists and psychologists study terrorists and
those who have committed acts of violent extremism to determine whether their
psychology played a role in their decisions. Understanding which tenets of Islam radical
groups for recruitment exploit is also helpful in making sense of the process. The social
situation of Muslims in France is unique, and a brief history is presented in this chapter,
as well. The third chapter explains where this Islamic radicalization is happening in
France, focusing on social media recruitment and the recruitment that occurs in prisons.
Finally, I present my conclusions for this study.

10

Alan Travis, “MI5 report challenges views on terrorism in Britain,” The Guardian, August 20, 2008,
http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2008/aug/20/uksecurity.terrorism1.
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Chapter I: What Is Radicalization?
Radicalization
The first step to understanding the growing Islamic radicalization in France is
defining radicalization. There are several definitions of radicalization in social science
literature, and they each vary in meaning. A former imam in the American corrections
system Frederick Al-Deen described radicalization as “something that everyone that is
older than fifteen knows. That they are a member of soccer teams, football teams,
basketball teams, unions, fraternities, sororities. Everybody’s taught to get fired up.”11
This definition of radicalization is something that everyone can relate to. In this sense,
radicalization simply means being committed to a cause and being excited about it. David
Mandel, a researcher at the Defence Research and Development Canada, defines
radicalization as “the active pursuit of and/or support for far-reaching changes in society
which may constitute a danger to the continuity of the democratic legal order (aim),
possibly by using undemocratic methods (means) which may harm the functioning of that
order (effect).”12 Though the aim may change from group to group or individual to
individual, all radicals want to change something in society by using unconventional
means. Often, these unconventional means are acts of terrorism. Marc Sageman, a

11

Melissa Jane Kronfeld, “Prislam: The Recruitment and Radicalization of Terrorist Operatives in the
Prison System and the Threat to the American Homeland” (PhD diss., Rutgers University, 2011), 12.
12
David R. Mandel, “Radicalization: What does it mean?” in Home-Grown Terrorism: Understanding and
Addressing the Root Causes of Radicalisation among Groups with an Immigrant Heritage in Europe, ed.
by Thomas M. Pick, Anne Speckhard, Beatrice Jacuch, NATO Science for Peace and Security Series SubSeries E: Human and Societal Dynamics-Vol. 60 (Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2009), 106.
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leading expert on prison and terrorism in the United States, uses a definition of
radicalization that is the one that most people think of when referring to acts of terrorism.
He states, “ Radicalization is the process of transforming individuals from rather
unexceptional and ordinary beginnings into terrorists willing to use violence for political
ends.”13

Theories of Radicalization
Mitchell Silber and Arvin Bhatt, senior intelligence analysts with the New York
Police Department, developed a four-stage model to explain the radicalization process.14
For the purposes of this thesis, this theory will be referred to as the Silber and Bhatt
model for the remainder of this work. The first stage is referred to as pre-radicalization,
and is considered a normal life.15 The next stage is the self-identification stage, where the
person explores ideology and is triggered by “a cognitive opening, or crisis, which shakes
one's certitude in previously held beliefs.”16 This crisis is key in the radicalization
process. Michael Arena, a law enforcement analyst, and Bruce Arrigo, a social theorist
and research scientist, emphasize that both internal forces of human nature and external
forces of the social environment play a role in the creation of self-concept.17 The type of
crisis varies from case to case; it can be a personal loss, an economic recession, a political
issue or a social problem. This crisis gives individuals an opportunity to go through a
process of doubt, both in self and in society. The third stage is indoctrination, where the

13

Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), viii.
It is important to note that this process of radicalization is not set in stone. The radicalization process is
fluid, and does not necessarily occur in these cookie-cutter type steps. This model is particularly helpful,
though, in explaining the basics of how this process occurs.
15
Mitchell D. Silber and Arvin Bhatt, “Radicalization in the West: A Homegrown Threat,” (The New York
City Police Department, 2007), 6.
16
Silber and Bhatt, 6.
17
Michael P. Arena and Bruce A. Arrgio, The Terrorist Identity: Explaining the Terrorist Threat (New
York: New York University Press, 2006), 16.
14
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adherence to radical worldview is intensified, and the fourth and final stage of the Silber
and Bhatt model is jihadization, which Silber and Bhatt describe as an acceptance “to
participate in jihad and self-designate themselves as holy warriors or mujahedeen.”18 An
extremist generally does not consciously commit to becoming a terrorist. Instead, the
involvement in terrorism “results from gradual exposure and socialization towards
extreme behavior.”19 The social psychologist Fathali Moghaddam calls radicalization “a
staircase to terrorism.”20 The eventual result of the process is to commit some sort of
violent act in hopes of achieving change. Dr. Peter Probst, a counter-terrorism
consultant, states that the goal of terrorism is “to immobilize the target groups and foster
panic, despair and, ultimately, psychological surrender. The aim of the concomitant
political and psychological operations is to convince target groups that the terrorists’ acts
are justified, and that to resist them is to court death.”21 His statement about the
psychological and political operations helps to understand the radicalization process. The
political and psychological operations that terrorists employ are designed to recruit
others.
The International Court of Justice (ICJ), the judicial branch of the United Nations,
released its own version of the radicalization process, which includes more steps than the
Silber and Bhatt model. This radicalization theory is referred to as the ICJ model for the

18

Silber and Bhatt, 43.
Randy Borum, “Psychology of Terrorism,” Mental Health Law & Policy Faculty Publications, 2004,
Paper 571, 23.
20
Laila Bokhari, “Pathways to Jihad: Radicalisation and the case of Pakistan. A way forward?” in HomeGrown Terrorism: Understanding and Addressing the Root Causes of Radicalisation among Groups with
an Immigrant Heritage in Europe, ed. by Thomas M. Pick, Anne Speckhard, Beatrice Jacuch, NATO
Science for Peace and Security Series Sub-Series E: Human and Societal Dynamics-Vol. 60 (Amsterdam:
IOS Press, 2009), 18.
21
Peter S. Probst,“Terrorism: Perception, Illusion and the Art of Political Warfare,” in Hypermedia
Seduction for Terrorist Recruiting, edited by Boaz Ganor, Katharina Von Knop, and Carlos Duarte
(Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2007), 6.
19
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remainder of this work. The significance of the ICJ model of the radicalization process
lies in its inclusion of a role model in the process. In this version, the first step is the
manipulation of communication, which means the recruit is isolated from broader
views.22 This could happen online or through a school, mosque, etc. The next aspect of
the radicalization process is social pressure, which includes things like reward and
punishment and the emphasis of social status, followed by the creation of role models.23
The presence of a role model plays a big role in the radicalization process. The role
model can be someone accessible who lives in the community and advises new recruits,
or it can be a martyr. Having a source of inspiration and authority helps the recruit justify
the use of violence as a means to achieve a political or religious goal. The role model
plays into the decision to commit an act of violence stemming from a radicalization
process, proved in Case Study Two. The next step is to make a moral commitment by
taking an oath or testament on behalf of the individuals, thereby redefining their
relationship with the world. The ultimate realization of the radicalization process is to
commit an act of violence in order to achieve a political, religious, or social goal.
These two theories of radicalization differ in several ways. Silber and Bhatt’s
model involves more internal forces, while the ICJ model involves outside forces. The
manipulation of communication and creation of role models are two of the most
influential steps of the radicalization process. The Silber and Bhatt model describes more
of the mental state during the radicalization process, while the ICJ model explains how
the process actually works.

22

“Policy memorandum on radicalism and radicalization.” The Hague: Ministry of Justice, August 19,
2005, 10.
23
Ibid., 10.
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Types of Radicals
This radicalization process can result in different types of radicals, and it is
important to understand the differences and similarities. Some individuals who become
radicalized, but never act on their beliefs or do not act violently until years later; and the
majority of all radicalized individuals do not become terrorists.24 Some individuals fall
under the umbrella of terrorism and some do not. The term terrorism has a variety of
definitions. The Global Terrorism Database defines terrorism as “the threatened or actual
use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic,
religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation.”25 This definition does
not include state-sponsored terrorism. Another terrorism research group describes
terrorism as “a tactic and strategy; a crime and a holy duty; a justified reaction to
oppression and an inexcusable abomination.”26 This definition is less technical than the
Global Terrorism Database definition, and could categorize a much wider range of events
as terrorism. The definitions of radicals also vary; so much that one person may consider
a member of a fascist party to be a radical, while others only consider individuals who
commit acts of terrorism to be radicals. This paper defines a radical as someone who uses
violence to achieve a political, religious, economic, or social agenda, so for these
purposes a radical is a terrorist.
France experiences all of these types of terrorist attacks, perpetrated by many
different terrorist groups. The recent rise in terrorist attacks by Islamic followers, though,
is cause for analysis. According to the Global Terrorism Database, the terrorist group
24

“Radicalization Dynamics: A Primer,” The Gang Enforcement Company, June 2012,
http://www.gangenforcement.com/uploads/2/9/4/1/29411337/radicalization_process.pdf.
25
“Codebook: Inclusion Criteria and Variables,” National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and
Responses to Terrorism (START). June 2015, 8. http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/downloads/Codebook.pdf.
26
“What is Terrorism?” International Terrorism and Security Research, accessed January 31, 2016,
http://www.terrorism-research.com/.
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Corsican National Liberation Front (FLNC) is responsible for the majority of the attacks
that occur in France, followed by unknown perpetrators.27 The unknown perpetrators
could be members of Islamic groups, white supremacist group, the separatist movements,
or none of these. Islamic attacks in France are almost always more deadly than any other
type of terrorist attack in the country, which could explain why the FLNC attacks do not
receive as much media attention as the Islamic attacks do. The Charlie Hebdo attacks in
January 2015 and the November 2015 Paris attacks, which Islamic radical groups
claimed responsibility for both, have shifted the media’s attention to the increasing
Islamic radicalization in France. The increase both in number of attacks and fatalities
make Islamic terrorism in France an important topic to consider.
Radicalization can occur through many avenues, but follows the Silber and Bhatt
model and the ICJ model of radicalization. The Silber and Bhatt model explains the
mental process of radicalization, while the ICJ model explains the outside pressures
involved in radicalization. Though the psychological state is important, the outside forces
of radicalization play a bigger role in the process.

27

“Codebook: Inclusion Criteria and Variables,” National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and
Responses to Terrorism (START). June 2015, 8. http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/downloads/Codebook.pdf.
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Chapter II: Who Becomes a Radical?
This chapter will analyze who becomes a radical. It will not create a profile of a
terrorist, because constantly evolving recruitment tactics make everyone a potential target
of recruitment. According to Dr. Steven Ellmann, a professor of law at New York Law
School, using profiling, whether based on race, religion, or some other category, is a
violation of “fundamental principles of the equal protection of the law.”28 It will,
however, highlight some indicators to look for and help with understanding who is
susceptible to radicalization. Psychological, religious, and social factors all influence
radicalization. France’s unique history and secular policies have created an atmosphere in
which people can justify radicalization.

Psychological Factors
In the past, many social scientists and psychologists have tried to explore the
mind of terrorists, searching for a mental disease or disorder of some sort to explain their
actions. Overwhelming evidence shows, though, that mental disorders and illnesses are
not a factor in terrorism. Though terrorists may exhibit signs of particular disorders, they
are often not diagnosed. A report published by the Department of Defense states,
“Studies have shown that the prevalence of mental illness among incarcerated terrorists is
as low or lower than in the general population. Although terrorists commit horrible acts,

28

Stephen Ellmann, “Racial Profiling and Terrorism,” New York Law School Review 46 (2002-2003): 676.
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they rarely match the profile of the classic psychopath.”29 Martha Crenshaw, a leading
expert on terrorism studies, states, “The outstanding common characteristic of terrorists is
their normality.”30
Researchers and psychologists have tried to use various mental illnesses and
disorders in order to explain why an individual becomes a terrorist and/or why an
individual commits an act of terrorism. Among these mental illnesses, Antisocial
Personality Disorder (ASPD) and psychopathy are the two most popular disorders that
researchers try to use to explain terrorism. ASPD is a diagnosis characterized by lifelong
symptoms of “engaging in a range of delinquent and antisocial behaviors, which might
include lying, stealing, aggression, and criminal activity.”31 Psychopathy includes these
symptoms of antisocial behaviors, but also includes a deficient emotional experience as
well as interpersonal exploitativeness.32 In a clinical analysis of terrorists, psychologist
Willem Martens discovered that not all terrorists have ASPD, nor are they all
psychopaths. He does state, however, that terrorists and people diagnoses with ASPD do
share characteristics such as:
Social alienation, disturbed early socialization process, aggressive, actionoriented, stimulus-hungry, narcissistic attitude, impulsivity and hostility,
suffering from early damage to their self-esteem, defensive attitude,
primitive defenses as shame, fear of dependency, unresolved oedipal
issues, omnipotent denial, escalatory events, particularly confrontation
with police, intolerant of criticism, arrogance and disdain, belief of
superiority of their own belief system, indifference to other people’s belief
systems, hostility, lack of self-criticism, justification of their violent
behavior, suffering from deep trauma, moral disengagement by
dehumanizing victims.33
29

Defense Human Resources Activity, “The Radicalization Process,” Department of Defense, accessed
September 17, 2015, http://www.dhra.mil/perserec/osg/terrorism/radicalization.htm.
30
Martha Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” Comparative Politics 13, no. 4 (1981): 390.
31
Randy Borum, “Psychology of Terrorism,” 31.
32
Ibid., 31.
33
W. H. J. Martens, “Terrorist with Antisocial Personality Disorder,” Journal of Forensic Psychology
Practice 4, no. 1 (2004): 45-56.
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It is important to recognize that not all terrorists have these qualities, and of course not all
people who display these characteristics will become terrorists. These are merely
characteristics that were present in the incarcerated terrorists that Martens studied in his
clinical trial.
Understanding that terrorism is not the result of a mental illness, it is necessary to
explore which psychological factors are exploited during the radicalization process.
Knowing how recruiters get into the minds of potential recruits and exploit factors that
are found in all human psyches can help to develop a plan in how to prevent
radicalization. Arena and Arrigo explain several of the psychological theories and
phenomena that are involved in converting to an extremist. One of the most popular
psychological explanations of radicalization is called psychodynamic theory. This theory
focuses on the “unconscious forces and their deterministic influence on human behavior
and social interaction.”34 Psychoanalytic theory is similar; both operate on the premise
that unconscious desires and external forces and events are key in shaping a person’s
actions and personality as an adult.35, 36 The most satisfying and complete explanation of
the personal logic of terrorism within the psychoanalytic theory is narcissism.37 Randy
Borum, a professor of strategy and intelligence studies, explains that the two key
narcissistic dynamics are “a grandiose sense of self and an idealized parental imago.”38, 39

34

Arena and Arrigo, The Terrorist Identity: Explaining the Terrorist Threat, 3.
“About Psychoanalysis,” American Psychoanalytic Association, accessed February 12, 2016,
http://www.apsa.org/content/about-psychoanalysis.
36
It is important to note the conflicting literature (specifically, Randy Borum’s “Psychology of Terrorism”)
that emphasizes the weak theoretical and empirical foundations on which psychoanalytical theory is
founded.
37
Borum, “Psychology of Terrorism,” 18.
38
Ibid., 19.
39
An imago is an unconscious, idealized mental image of someone, especially a parent, that influences a
person’s behavior.
35
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This idea of an idealized parental imago means that a person wants to have a relationship
with someone that they think is perfect. Following a charismatic leader, a role model,
would satisfy this need for an idealized parental figure. The ICJ model of radicalization
includes the presence of a role model, and thus satisfies this psychoanalytic theory of
narcissism, while the Silber and Bhatt model does not.
Other psychological theories that are emphasized in the radicalization and
recruitment of terrorists are ego identity, developmental theory, collective identity, and
social identity theory. Psychologist Erik Erikson developed several theories and
definitions regarding how an individual views him or herself, and how his or her
personality develops over time. Ego identity refers to the “awareness of the fact of that
there is a self-sameness and continuity in the ego’s synthesizing methods and that these
methods are effective in safeguarding the sameness and continuity of one’s meaning for
others.”40 Erikson developed this definition of identity in response to the question, “Who
am I?” and it is one of the first definitions of identity. Erikson’s developmental theory
also contributes to sense of self. The theory is sensitive to the influence of family,
socialization, and other social factors, but it relies most heavily on the belief that
individuals have a strong internal desire to fulfill certain needs such as love,
belongingness, attachment, and esteem, in order to develop a healthy personality.41
Collective identity, which refers to the sense of belonging to a group, allows people to
find meaning in their lives, a sense of coherent structure, and a stable social role to
occupy.42 The final theory, social identity theory, occurs when individuals strive to

40

Arena and Arrigo, The Terrorist Identity: Explaining the Terrorist Threat, 17.
Ibid., 18.
42
Ibid., 20.
41
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maintain or enhance their self-esteem, often through social groups or categories.43
Simply having others think that an individual belongs to a group is not enough; the
individual themselves must make belonging to a group part of his or her identity. These
theories satisfy the ICJ model’s requirement of social pressure, while the Silber and Bhatt
model does not have an equivalent stage. The manipulation of communication and
creation of role models steps in the ICJ model parallel these psychological theories, and
emphasize group belonging and group identity. These four psychological theories relate
to terrorism in the explanation as to why people are drawn to radical behavior and groups.
Arrigo and Arena explain that the need to have a stable identity (ego identity theory and
developmental theory) and the need to belong (collective identity and social identity
theory) helps explain the similarity in behavior of terrorists in different groups of
different motivations and goals.44 Individuals who become radicalized and join these
extremist movements do so in order to satisfy these needs of a stable identity and
belonging to a group.
Extremist groups focus on gaining new recruits using psychology in addition to
theology. Social psychologist Arie Kruglanski explains that Islamic extremist groups,
such as ISIL, take advantage of two basic human needs: the need for cognitive closure
and the need for personal significance.45 He defines cognitive closure as “individual’s
desire for a firm answer to a question and an aversion toward ambiguity.”46 The Muslims
in France are usually descendants of immigrants, who often experience economic and
43

Ibid., 28.
Ibid., 22.
45
Arie W. Kruglanski, “Psychology Not Theology: Overcoming ISIS’ Secret Appeal,” E-International
Relations, October 28, 2014, http://www.e-ir.info/2014/10/28/psychology-not-theology-overcoming-isissecret-appeal/.
46
Maria Konnikova, “Why We Need Answers,” The New Yorker, April 30, 2013,
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social discrimination. This instability creates anxiety, which extremist groups can easily
exploit. This idea of knowing what is going to happen, even if it is death, provides
comfort to new recruits. This is a form of cognitive closure, because it claims to explain
how the world works. Groups such as ISIL also offer an invaluable psychological reward,
earning status as heroes and martyrs, which brings a sense of personal significance.47
Extremist groups also take advantage of “humans’ most primordial proclivities, those for
aggression and for sex.”48 The violent nature of war allows recruits to express their
aggression in a way that seems legitimized and legal, and the promise of many young
wives satisfies the need for sex.

Religious Factors
The religiosity of Islam plays a large role in the Islamic radicalization occurring
in France. Adhering to religious fundamentalism does not mean that one is partaking in
an extremist movement. Martin E. Marty, a religious scholar, and R. Scott Appleby, a
professor of history, produced a project concerning fundamentalism during the 1990s. In
the volume about religious fundamentalism, the authors define religious as including the
following elements: “what concerns people ultimately, and provides them with personal
and social identity; leads adherents to prefer myth and symbol, along with rite and
ceremony, over other forms of expression; tends to imply some sort of cosmic or
metaphysical backdrop and to stipulate certain behavioral correlates.”49 These
characteristics of religion draw new followers in, and can be exploited by extremist
groups in order to recruit new members. Marty and Appleby state, “Fundamentalists
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begin as traditionalists who perceive some challenge or threat to their core identity, both
social and personal.”50 ISIL says that it adheres to the most literal tradition of the Qur’an
possible, contributing to the idea that it is a fundamental Islamic group. The word
fundamental is a key part of understanding fundamentalism; as Marty and Appleby point
out, fundamentalists select what they believe is fundamental to their religion and only
follow that.
Quintan Wiktorowicz, in his book Radical Islam Rising, explains how identifying
with a certain ideology aids in helping individuals join extremist groups. He states, “An
intense ideological identification with the values of the campaign acts to 'push' the
individual in the direction of participation while a prior history of activism and
integration into supportive networks acts as the structural 'pull' that encourages the
individual to make good on his strongly held beliefs.”51 Individuals use religion to cope
with their life, and also expect this religion to make some sort of change in their lives.
Wiktorowicz contains his explanation of why radical Islam is attractive to new followers
below:
Radical Islam activists promote a set of values and identities that
challenge dominant cultural codes. In doing so, they seek to create a
common community of true believers tied together through a shared
interpretation of Islam typically characterized by high levels of tension
with common religious understandings. Activist proselytizing thus focuses
on teaching Muslims (and even non-Muslims) about the deviance of
mainstream interpretations while offering the movement's own
understanding as definitive. The resulting network of shared meaning is
the basis of a common identity that frequently involves commands to risky
activism in the name of God.52
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Extremist groups such as ISIL use incentives, networks, and frames to persuade people to
join their movement. For example, young men are often promised multiple wives upon
their arrival in Syria, and dying in war results in 72 virgins in Heaven, though this is not
explicated stated anywhere in the Qur’an.53 Different types of networks that Islamic
groups use to proselytize to other people include charities, cultural societies, professional
associations, mosques, political parties, and religious lessons and study circles.54
Converting to a religion is a major life decision. Converts are particularly useful
for extremist groups for the following three reasons: the nature of conversion, the role of
converts in the global Jihadist cause, and the “testament to the complex, amorphous
nature of the threat of terrorism.”55 Converts are particularly zealous and dedicated to the
cause. They are willing to do anything that it takes to prove that they are serious about
their new religion. One French intelligence officer stated that converts are particularly
dangerous because they want to “show other Muslims their worth,” “go further than
anyone else,” and are “full of rage and want to prove themselves.”56

Social Factors
The radicalization process in France is so unique because of the history of
Muslims in France. Three major Islamic movements characterize Islam in France. The
Salafi movement, an ultra-conservative reform movement within Sunni Islam, became
less relevant in France after the 9/11 attacks in the United States because French
authorities refused Salafist sheiks entry into the country, suspended a June 2001 Salafist
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convention, and placed imams under surveillance.57 There are 90 mosques that preach
Salafist interpretations of Islam in France in 2015, compared to the 45 in 2010.58 These
trends show that the Salafist movement has gained popularity in the recent years because
of its strict adherence to Sunni Islam, as a response to liberal Western actions.
Ahbâch, which draws inspiration from Sunni Islam and Sufism, is another Islamic
movement that is present in France.59 It developed in Lebanon, and by 1996 a French
division had been created.60 Ahbâch advocates social and economic integration in
Europe, but does not permit participation in political process because it is contrary to its
beliefs.61 The third Islamic movement in France is Tablighi Jama’at, which arose around
1972. It adheres to strict Sunni Islam beliefs, and also prohibits any participation in
politics.62
Many social factors contribute to the radicalization process, including education,
discrimination, laws, and socio-economic status. An estimated 8 to 10% of the population
in France is Muslim, which is the highest percentage in Europe.63 Assimilation into
society is extremely difficult because of various French laws as well as Muslim beliefs
and practices. Molly Moore states, “This isolation and discrimination creates a generation
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that has little respect for the French authority, little chance of social movement, and deep
resentment towards the majority of French or even Europeans.”64
Discrimination of Muslims in France is prevalent, even today. In 2010, the French
legislative body passed a law that prohibited the covering of one’s face in public spaces.65
The law states, “No one can, in a public space, wear an outfit which hides one’s face.”66
This controversial law essentially prohibits Muslim women from wearing the burka or
niqab, but not from wearing the hijab. (See Figure 1)67 Another law that France recently
passed in 2004 is forbids anyone from wearing any religious symbol in a public school.68
This can include crosses, rosaries, and any sort of head covering. Prohibiting the burka
and niqab limits Muslims’ right to practice their religion, and results in feelings of
oppression and discrimination. These laws have increased anti-Islamic sentiments in
France, as evidenced by statistics collected by the National Observatory Against
Islamophobia, which states that 80% of the anti-Muslim acts involving violence and
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assault were directed at women, most of whom were veiled.69 One 2013 source states that
74% of French citizens view the Islamic faith as “intolerant” and “incompatible” with
French values, while 70% said that there are too many foreigners in France.70, 71 French
citizens and Muslims, whether nationals or immigrants, share a mutual distrust towards
one another. The sense of social injustice creates an attitude that views the Muslim
inmates as “victims of society” and harbors ideologies that condone and encourage
retribution.72

Figure 1: Examples and explanations of the niqab, hijab, and burka.
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A study by the National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies in 2005
showed that the unemployment rate of those of French origin was 9.5%, while that of
those of a foreign background was 14%.73 Muslims are much less likely to be contacted
by potential employers after they apply for a job than Jews or Catholics, as shown in
Figure 2.74 Additionally, there are zero Muslim members of the Assemblée Nationale, out
of 577 seats. Without political representation, French Muslims cannot take effective
action against discriminatory laws, such as the two laws mentioned above. This
continuation of discrimination and underrepresentation contributes to the reasoning
behind the radicalization of Muslims in France.

Figure 2: Rate of callback for an interview.

France prosecutes terrorists in a different way than most of the world. While most
countries, such as the United States and Britain, use ordinary courts coupled with new
powers to prosecute terrorists, France uses special courts and exceptional
counterterrorism procedures within their judicial system.75 The investigation and
prosecution relies heavily on investigating magistrates, who direct the law enforcement
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investigations into terrorism.76 France has shown a pattern of a zero-tolerance approach
against supporters of Islamist terrorism since the 1990s, often conducting wide scale raids
that result in mass arrests.77 This draconian approach leads to a diminishing legitimacy of
the state in the eyes of its Muslim citizens.78 French Muslims feel unjustly discriminated
against, and thus act out against the government.
The combination of the social pressures, discrimination, and their belief systems
puts Muslims in France in a particularly vulnerable position with regards to
radicalization. The ICJ model of radicalization capitalizes on these types of social factors
in the step of manipulation of communication. This manipulation of communication
includes emphasizing the discrimination and social pressures of Muslims in France,
which can provide a catalyst for the radicalization process. The economic and political
disadvantage that Muslims in France are subject to plays a major role in the radicalization
process. The Silber and Bhatt model does not take into account these types of social
factors. Additionally, the religious environment and history in France can be easily
emphasized through these radicalization processes.
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Chapter III: How Are Radicals Recruited?
The Internet and Social Media Recruitment
Recruitment is essential to terrorist organizations. Gabriel Weimann, a professor
of communications, explains, “Recruitment provides the killers, the suicide bombers, the
kidnappers, the executioners, the engineers, the soldiers, and the armies of future
terrorism.”79 Without recruiting new members, terrorist organizations are not able to
carry out their operations. The number of Internet users, and consequently social media
users, continues to rise at a dramatic rate each year. A report by Simon Kemp, a professor
of modern languages, outlines this Internet growth, stating that worldwide Internet users
increased 21% from January 2014 to January 2015, and the number of users on social
media worldwide increased by 12% during that same time year.80 Both Islamic websites
and social media websites are key components of the recruitment and radicalization
process today. Peter Probst stresses the importance of understanding the radicalization
process, and the role of the Internet in that process, in the following statement:
In our struggle against terrorism, we focus almost exclusively on the carnage,
the inherent drama and the horror of unspeakable acts. But violence is only
one arrow in the terrorist’s operational quiver. Of equal, and at times indeed
very great, importance are the complementary political and psychological
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operations. These make use of conventional media, the Internet, leaflets,
rumor and wall graffiti as means to disseminate the message.81, 82
Radicalization is occurring more quickly, more anonymously, and more often with the
use of the Internet.83 Exploring how these tools are used in Islamic radicalization as a
whole will help to explain how these are specifically being used in France to recruit new
members. Anna Erelle’s experience being recruited via Facebook and Skype serves as the
case study for this section. Anna Erelle is the pseudonym of an undercover French
journalist, and her book In the Skin of a Jihadist is her firsthand account of her
experience.
The phenomenon of using the Internet as a recruitment tool for radical Islamic
groups is nothing new. A report by the formerly named Foreign Broadcast and
Information Service in 1999 stated, “These days, if you’re not on the web, you don’t
exist.”84 Weimann outlines the advantages to using the Internet as a recruitment tool in
the following statement:
It makes information gathering easier for potential recruits, by offering
more information, more quickly, and in multimedia format; the global
reach of the Net allows groups to publicize events to more people; and, by
increasing the possibilities for interactive communication, new
opportunities for assisting groups are offered, along with more chances for
contacting the group directly.85
Terrorist groups use marketing techniques similar to those of large commercial
companies, tracking and documenting information about users who visit their sites, and
81
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then contacting them at a later date.86 The Internet, whether social media sites or
traditional Islamic websites, allows terrorist operatives the chance to identify, profile, and
select potential candidates for their network. The Internet is simply the first step in the
radicalization and recruitment process. It can provide a point of contact for the potential
recruit, and allows him or her to get a taste of what the organization believes in.
Language is a key component in terrorist recruitment, and is instrumental in
helping legitimizing the cause. The way in which these Islamic websites and social media
accounts phrase events and situations helps create a narrative conducive to violent
extremism, signifiying the manipulation of communication step in the ICJ model. Probst
points out, “Terrorists describe the savage murders of social workers, news reporters,
business people, teachers, civil servants, and even religious leaders as ‘executions.’ Thus
they convey the impression that the killings are somehow legitimate and follow due
process, and adhere to the customary laws of war-or are at least mandated by a higher
religious precept or authority.”87 Additionally, calling their own men “political prisoners”
or “prisoners-of-war” legitimize their crimes, and makes it seem like the terrorist
organization and whomever they are fighting are engaging in a war. Calling gunmen who
die while killing others “freedom fighters” or “martyrs” gives those people a sense of
honor and respect. This type of language draws in new recruits, and makes the terrorist
acts seem respectable, legitimate, and legal.
The Internet is a way for terrorist organizations to tell their story in order to gain
new members. Graphic design elements, such as calligraphy, semantics, and visual
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imagery, are key in attracting new members of the audience. Fighel states, “Islamic visual
motifs and key words are used to ‘trap’ sympathizers and potential recruits, as they offer
the needed seduction through ‘virtual’ online Da’awa using marking techniques similar to
those employed by commercial enterprises.”88, 89 The Internet and social media websites
and accounts are used for initial attraction, ideological recruitment, and social support
rather than for direct operational recruitment. Once a person is attracted to the radical
idea and has support for conversion, the operational recruitment is relatively easy. The
first step in the on-line radicalization process is to use common Islamic key words and
idioms in the website’s address and content.90 Some popular Jihadi websites embed
idioms such as these into their Internet address: Al Sahat (the fields), Al Qal’ah (the
fortress), Al Islah (reform), and Al Ansar (supporters or warriors of Islam).91 This raises
the amount of website traffic and ensures that new people are looking at the content.
Although the idioms may seem innocent, some may contain double meanings and subtextual messages, if interpreted through the radical Islamic schools of thought. Additional
Islamic terminology and motifs key words that are subject to radial interpretation include
the following: Al-Walaa wal-baraa’ (absolute allegiance to the community of Muslims
and total rejection of non-Muslims), Ansar, Al Neda (the Calling for the true and genuine
believers to join true Islam), Bilad al-Haramain (the Land of the Two Shrines- Mecca and
Medina), Jihad, etc.92 New radical Islamic motifs can easily gain legitimacy because they
appear to be authentic when they are used alongside, or in proximity to, mainstream
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Islamic symbols and cultural references.93 Employing this concept along with the
language and narrative ploy mentioned above helps make radical Islam seem legitimate
and accepted. These websites also use only the Islamic Hijra calendar, instead of the
Gregorian calendar, which gives them another level of authenticity. The “rapid visual
screening process” is also in play in this process, and involves the potential recruit
subconsciously scanning for additional motifs on the homepage of the website he or she
has stumbled upon.94 Radical Islamic visual motifs and calligraphy shapes are important,
because they add a sense of mystery to the website. At this point, the potential recruit is
already interested in some part of violent extremism, whether it is subconsciously or
consciously. Some websites also use recordings of radical Islamic songs or verses from
the Qur’an.95 These elements draw in the potential recruits, and encourage them to
explore the website in order to learn more. They also help create a perception of reality
for the target audience that is favorable to the radicalization process.
Though the methods mentioned in the paragraphs above apply to extremist sites
and groups on the Internet, the rise of social media sites has made it easier for Islamic
groups to recruit new members. This transition from traditional Islamic websites to social
media has been relatively easy for Islamic extremist groups because of the time and effort
they expended on the websites in the beginning. The same sort of language and key
words are used in social media. Instead of purposefully going to a specific Islamic
website, a potential recruit can simply visit one of the social media sites such as
Facebook, Twitter, or Instagram to connect with a radical Muslims around the world.
Various messaging apps such as WhatsApp, WeChat, Skype, and Facebook Messenger
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allow users to communicate easily and cheaply, if not freely. Anyone with access can use
these social media sites to connect with anyone around the world, and then use these
messaging apps to communicate. Radical Muslims are taking advantage of this easy of
using social media as a recruitment tool, even in France. The use of social media in this
way easily fits the criteria for manipulation of communication and social pressure for the
ICJ model of radicalization. ISIL has been particularly successful using Twitter,
Facebook, and Skype to recruit new members. An article in The Atlantic outlines how
ISIL’s success on Twitter is possible. It uses a Twitter app called “Dawn of Glad
Tidings,” which is promoted to its top users as a way to keep up with the latest news of
the Jihadist network.96 The app then posts tweets to the user’s twitter account, including,
“links, hash tags, and images, and the same content is also tweeted by the accounts of
everyone else who has signed up for the app, spaced out to avoid triggering Twitter's
spam-detection algorithms.”97 In this way, ISIL is able to generate more than 10,000
mentions per day on Twitter. This traffic increases awareness of its cause, and makes it
easier for recruiters to identify and profile potential members. Users also tag their tweets
with the hash tag #EI, which is an abbreviation for l’état islamique.98 Once a recruiter
feels comfortable or confident with the recruit, he or she will direct the recruit to an
Islamic extremist website to learn more. Another aspect of social media that jihadists are
able to take advantage of is the ease of changing profiles and usernames. For example,
French citizens who have pledged their allegiance to the Islamic State create Twitter
accounts in order to spread information and propaganda in the French language. Once
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authorities become aware of the accounts, they notify Twitter and the account is closed.
To prevent this, the jihadists will change their usernames by simply adding one letter or
number. This way, authorities have a harder time keeping up with the accounts, and the
jihadists are able to spread their message more easily. Since working on this project, an
account with the username of infosensibles38 has already been closed, and likely
rerouted to a different username. Twitter accounts spreading ISIL propaganda in the
French language are easy to find, especially when searching by the hash tag #EI.
Radical Islamic groups have also been successful recruiting teenagers and young
adults in France through Facebook. Lori Hinnant tells the story of Nora, a fifteen-yearold daughter of Moroccan immigrants living in France, who was recruited to the Nursa
Front.99 Nora’s family discovered that she had a second Facebook account targeted by
recruiters, which included “propaganda videos…showing veiled women firing machine
guns and Syrian children killed in warfare.”100 These videos, in the French language, also
referred repeatedly to the restriction of the use of veils and headscarves in France.101
These extremists are able to make a case for violence by playing on these issues that are
important to Muslims in France. The family learned about Nora’s methods and means of
travel through the investigation that took place after her disappearance. A young mother
in France paid for Nora’s travel and gave her a place to stay overnight in Paris on her
journey, and has since been criminally charged in the investigation, along with one other
person.102 Although investigators do not yet have all the details of how the recruiting
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process took place with these two girls, they do know that social media played a large
role.

Case Study I
Anna Erelle, a pseudonym, is an undercover journalist in France who specializes
in ISIL. She has interviewed several French citizens who attempted to or successfully
joined ISIL in Syria. Though she is an undercover journalist, her experience with online
extremist recruitment allows an inside look at how this process unfolds. The journalist’s
journey began when she shared a video posted on Facebook by a militant named Abu
Bilel al-Firanzi in the spring of 2014. She created a fake Facebook account claiming the
name of Mélodie, with her profile picture as the cartoon Jasmine from the Disney movie
Aladdin, in order to aid in her research on European teenagers who were tempted by
Islamist extremism. As Erelle checked Facebook later that night, she saw the following
messages from Abu Bilel:
Salaam alaikum, sister. I see you watched my video. It’s gone viral-crazy!
Are you Muslim?
What do you think about mujahideen?
Last question: are you thinking about coming to Syria?
Bilel’s message was concise and to the point. He assumed that some who post or repost
things that sympathize with Islamic extremists may wish to move to Syria to help
advance ISIL. Throughout their conversations that night, Erelle learned that Bilel was
direct and authoritative. He answered her questions about Islam and ISIL, and asked her
to video chat via Skype. Bilel also mentioned that Mélodie should get ready for her
hijrah.103
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By mentioning these deeply religious and personal parts of Islam during the first
conversation, Bilel was attempting to form a bond with Mélodie. Even though he did not
know anything about her, he tried to fill a parental role by advising Mélodie on the steps
she needed to take in order to strengthen her conversion to Islam. Acting as a spiritual
guide makes it easier for the recruiter to gain trust and respect. This follows the ICJ
model of radicalization by creating social pressure and a role model for Mélodie to
follow.
As the weeks continued on, Bilel kept contacting Mélodie through Facebook
messenger. He asked her to Skype instead, stating that conversations were more secure
that way.104 Bilel attempted to lull Mélodie into a false sense of security during their
conversations. No matter what the question was, he was able to turn his answer into
something that would be comforting to a newly converted Muslim teenage girl living in
France. Mélodie mentioned that she liked children, and Bilel pointed out that many
women serve ISIL as surrogate mothers, and that she would fit in with them perfectly.105
Taking care of children would give Mélodie, and other girls like her, a sense of purpose
while in Syria. When she said that she liked Bilel’s Kalashnikov machine gun, he
immediately promised many guns and shooting lessons.106, 107 During their first Skype
conversation, Bilel described Syria as “paradise,” stating, “A lot of women fantasize
about us; we’re Allah’s warriors.”108
The way that these Islamic extremists interact with potential recruits is one of the
key reasons that they are so successful. These examples show the manipulation of
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communication that Bilel took advantage of in the ICJ model of radicalization. His choice
of words and ability to capitalize on Mélodie’s likes and dislikes represent his capability
to manipulate the conversations. They are persistent and authoritative while offering
young adults in France a way to escape their lives of disappointment and discrimination
with an actual territory and the promise of becoming a hero. The recruiting process with
females works slightly differently, because the extremists often try to lure the recruits
with a promise of marriage. While skyping with Mélodie, Bilel said, “If you agree to
marry me, I’ll treat you like a queen.”109 Bilel asked Mélodie to bring girlfriends, and not
her male cousin, to Syria with her when she completed her hijrah, because “women in
Europe are treated badly and used like objects.”110 Recruiters romanticize themselves and
their daily lives in order to make ISIL territories an attractive place to be. The extremists
use these stigmas and discrimination against women and Muslims in Europe to try to
persuade them to join the cause. The combination of romanticizing ISIL and pointing out
flaws in Europe allows recruiters to present violent extremism as a viable option.
Bilel also exploited Mélodie’s faith in order to convince her to join him in Syria.
He stated, “While we’re out risking our lives, you’re spending your days doing
meaningless activities. Being religious means imposing your values. I’m worried about
you, Mélodie, because I sense that you have a good soul, and if you continue to live
among kafirs, you’ll burn in hell.”111 Bilel told Mélodie that they “represent God’s will,”
and that “giving [infidels] a painful death is a service to Allah.”112 Bilel mentioned that
jihadists prefer new converts because they are “more serious about religion, and at the
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same time more open about life.”113 He later explained that he meant that the women take
their religion seriously, but also know how to please a man.
Islamic extremists are able to successfully gain new recruits by using both guilt
and promise of a better life. Recruiters use the guise of Islam in order to convince people
to join their cause. New converts are easily impressionable and can be persuaded to
follow this misinterpretation of Islam. This twisted sense of devotion to the religion is
often a selling point.
Erelle and a photographer from the journal for which she works did plan to travel
to Istanbul to secretly photograph the “mother” who was supposed to accompany
Mélodie to Syria, and from there the two planned to travel to a town on the Syrian border
to meet with another contact of theirs. Bilel believed that he had successfully convinced a
young French woman to join ISIL, travel to Syria, and marry him. The last conversation
that Mélodie had with Bilel was via Skype, while Erelle herself was in Amsterdam.
Mélodie said she was bringing her fifteen-year old female cousin, who was extremely
scared to take the journey to Syria. After Mélodie denied Bilel the chance to talk with the
cousin, he became extremely angry and authoritative. These are his words:
Are you going to let me speak to Yasmine: yes or no? Do you think I’m an
idiot? From now on, you’re going to shut up. I’m part of a terrorist
organization. You can’t talk to me like that. Don’t you know who I am? I
command a hundred soldiers every day. I haven’t even told you a quarter
of the truth. I’m wanted internationally; that’s why I can’t even go to our
cities in Turkey. I can only travel to Iraq. I’m thirty-eight, you brat, and
you and your friend can’t bring me down. You don’t know who I am. You
better tread lightly. 114
Once Bilel sensed that something is wrong, he immediately responded with threats and
disrespect. This proves that his actions and words throughout his conversations with
113
114

Ibid., 104.
Yasmine was the name of Mélodie’s cousin, who does not exist.

34

Mélodie were simply a plot to try to persuade her to travel to Syria to be with him. Once
Bilel realized that Mélodie went back to France instead of joining him in Syria, he
threatened her several times. Bilel’s emotional involvement in this process shows how
serious recruitment is for jihadists.
The case of Mélodie and Bilel shows two things: the process of recruitment via
social media, and how quickly the idea spreads throughout the social media. After Bilel
announced his intention to marry Mélodie, young women from all over Europe began to
reach out to her via Facebook asking questions relating to traveling to Syria. They ranged
from questions about what to pack to outcries of desperation regarding the decision to
travel to Syria.115 Mélodie’s account received these messages less than three weeks after
her initial contact with Bilel. Social media websites make this initial contact easy, and
allow people interested in jihad to connect with other people.
Throughout Erelle’s investigation, she learned that Bilel, whose real name is
Rachid X., was born in northern Paris, and that he was the French fighter closest to Abu
Bakr al-Baghdadi.116 Bilel made decisions about the day-to-day operations of the French
battalions there, as well as organized language and religion classes for the new recruits
who recently arrived in Syria.117 He was reported killed while trying to reach a peace
agreement with the Nursa Front, but he is still considered to be alive by French
authorities. Though Erelle is an undercover journalist and her reaction to the attempted
radicalization was fake, this case study still shows the effectiveness of the radicalization
techniques used by Islamic extremist groups on social media. They use tactics to play on
the vulnerability of their potential recruits, and emphasize the oppressive environment in
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which Muslims in France live. This case study follows the ICJ model of radicalization,
and not the Silber and Bhatt model.

ISIL Publications and Recruitment Methods
Aside from affiliated accounts, ISIL also uses its own publications to try to recruit
new members. Al-Hayat Media is an organization in the public relations branch of ISIL
that specializes in the translation of propaganda for sympathizers and fighters outside of
the territory itself.118 It publishes a magazine in the French language called Dār al-Islām.
Mathieu Slama, a communication expert, states that the primary goal of the magazine is
recruitment.119 Choosing to publish a magazine in French ensures that the message
reaches strategic places such as France, Belgium, and northern Africa. The title Dār alIslām refers to the “land of Islam.” The first issue focused on the importance of hijrah
and travelling to the land controlled by the Islamic State.120
The seventh issue of the magazine, released in November 2015, has 58 pages and
features photos ranging from women and children to prisoners who have been executed.
The very first sentence of the introduction states, “Poor France. She finished the year like
she started it: in tears and blood.”121, 122 After a brief analysis of the November 13, 2015
attacks in Paris, the magazine addresses the prophetic methodology of establishing the
religion, and then how to save your family from “Fire.” Quotes from the Qur’an are
found abundantly throughout the issue, always in bold. The thing that is different about
the French publication and the English publication is that Dār al-Islām emphasizes the
118
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secular laws in France, which oppress the Muslims living there. The seventh issue
features the chart of secularism in schools, shown in Figure 1, which is a poster placed in
all public schools in France explaining the separation of church and state. The magazine
labels the chart as “la charte de la mécréance,” which is translated as “The chart of
disbelief.”123 ISIL is using resources directly from the French government in order to
foster contempt and highlight the feelings of oppression within Muslims who read the
magazines. The magazine also features an interview with Abû Samîr al-Urdunî, who is an
influential person in the Islamic State, and also a section that mentions how the rest of the
world views ISIL. The magazine ends with a section that shows photos of the aftermath
of the attacks in Paris (Figures 2 and 3).124
These ISIL publications are dispersed through social media, and are therefore
used as a recruitment technique. Each step of the ICJ model of radicalization is
emphasized in the Dār al-Islām magazines. This form of communication is clearly
manipulated, as evidenced by how ISIL labels the chart of secularism. This chart also
creates a social pressure for Muslims in France, calling for some sort of action as a
response to this discrimination. The interview with Abû Samîr al-Urdunî provides an
instant role model, while the result of the moral commitment of the jihadists involved in
the Paris attacks emphasizes that stage in the ICJ model.
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Figure 3: “The chart of disbelief” Source: Dār-al-Islām: La France à Genoux.
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Figure 4 Source: Dār-al-Islām: La France à Genoux

Figure 5 Source: Dār-al-Islām: La France à Genoux
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Prison Recruitment
Prisons are one of the key places that Islamic radicalization takes place in France
and have been called “the cradle of the future Jihad.”125 Around 70 percent of inmates
practice Islam, though Muslims make up less than 8 percent of the general French
population.126, 127 This disproportionate number of Muslims in French prisons compared
to Muslims in the French population create a sort of breeding ground for radicalization.
Moussa Khedimellah, a sociologist specializing in Islam in Europe, attributes the
disproportionate number of Muslims in French prisons to their failure to assimilate into
French society, and discrimination by laws and citizens also plays a role.128 The internal
and external environments work together to create a unique situation for French Muslims,
and those who may be interested in the religion. As more and more European Muslims
are being jailed after attempting to join, or returning from, the Islamic State, the threat of
prison radicalization increases. Prison offers an opportunity for Muslims to convert to
radical Islam, or even non-Muslims to convert. Frank Viviano, a journalist, also describes
French prisons as a “terrorist university,” where smuggled tapes and materials, including
bomb making instructions, anti-Western propaganda, and training manuals are easily
available.129 The prevalence of these radical Islamic materials proves that this is a
growing epidemic in French prisons. Prisons, however, have not always been a
recruitment center for Islamic radicals. In 1992, one inmate told the French newspaper Le
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Monde that he only knew of a few inmates discussing Islam, but one year later stated that
he found “extremists who spent their time trying to convert the maximum number of
prisoners, proselytizing at a runaway pace.”130 This growth has only continued in recent
years, as evidenced by the many acts of terror committed by people who were formerly
incarcerated in France.
Analyzing why and how radicalization happens in prisons is essential to
understand the Islamic radicalization occurring in French prisons currently. People in
prison are especially susceptible to terrorist recruitment, or just radicalization in general,
because of their unique situation. Many people may feel that they have hit rock bottom,
so they have nothing to lose in choosing to join a radical organization or movement. Alan
Kreuger, an economist, states, “On the supply side, the economics of crime suggests that
people with low opportunity costs will become involved in terrorism.”131 Belonging to
radical Islam brings a sense of comfort to prisoners who may feel lonely. Some extremely
vulnerable inmates may turn to terrorism or radicalization as a last resort, in hopes that it
will give them a reason to live. The religious aspect gives inmates a sense of belonging
and something to hope for. The promises of the afterlife give inmates an enticing reason
to join, and gives them reason to participate in illegal and potentially deadly acts. Inmate
recruitment works in one of the following two ways: inmates belonging to the radical
group recruit inmates directly, or they target others for recruitment after release.132 The
first way is the most common way that inmates are recruited to radical Islam in France.
Inmates already believing and participating in radical Islam recruit other inmates while
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both are incarnated. To these potential recruits, belonging to a group that has power and
the ability to act, usually through causing mass destruction, becomes appealing. One
French security official explained, “In France, the path to radical Islam often begins with
a minor offense that throws a young man into an overcrowded, violent jail and produces a
hardened convert ready for jihad.”133 Because of external factors, such as a personal
crises or discrimination, the jail sentence is a turning point for these young men. These
impressionable inmates see radical Islam as a viable option to improve their lives.
Both Dr. Mark Hamm and Dr. Melissa Kronfeld, who has a PhD in global affairs
from Rutgers University, have extensively research prison radicalization in the United
States and have been influential in explain how prison radicalization works. Two schools
of thought regarding Islam in prisons exist; one side states that Islamic prisoners are a
threat, and the other protests that the Muslim faith offers the prisoners a reasonable and
workable path to rehabilitation.134 Prison life provides a unique opportunity for religion
to make a meaningful impact on an inmate. Research shows that religion is a way for a
prisoner to cope with unnatural surroundings, and provides alternatives to “passivity,
withdrawal, conning, aggression, and predatory violence,” which are common coping
mechanisms that inmates exhibit.135 Hamm separates prisoners who convert to a religion
into 5 categories: the crisis convert, the protection-seeking covert, the searching convert,
the manipulating convert, and the free-world recruited convert. These prisoners are not
trying to join a religion in order to commit a terrorist attack. Instead, they turn to religion
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as a source of comfort, and then radicalize. The crisis convert is the prisoner who turns to
religion because of a personal crisis, such as losing personal freedom while being
incarcerated. This type of convert is searching for something to make his life meaningful.
The protection-seeking convert, on the other hand, joins a religion in order to obtain
protection.136 This type of inmate may feel that he is at risk for bodily injury from another
group of inmates, such as a gang. The searching convert often join a religion based on
peer pressure. The manipulative convert joins a religion for special privileges, such as
special meals, books, clothing, or visits, and the free-world recruited convert is one who
joins based on an interaction with a religious leader who visits the prison.137 While most
inmates do not convert to radical Islam while incarcerated, Fathali Moghaddam asserted
that the reason for Islamist extremism to take root is “among individuals who become
convinced they are unjustly treated because of their group membership, they have no
voice, and no hope for a better future.”138
Hamm’s research shows the while traditional Islam might have a pacifying effect
in prisons in the United States, the mutated form of prison Islam poses a viable threat.
The faith-based rehabilitation programs that are in place in the United States are not
available in France. In the United States, religion is viewed as a tool of rehabilitation, and
faith-based programs suggest that “prisoners (can) be changed morally after being
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subjected to a specific regime.”139 State-sponsored religious materials and representatives
have a marginal status in France because of the limiting funding it receives.140 This lack
of funding is evident in “the random character of worship facilities in prisons, the poor
status and low remuneration of chaplains.”141 Because of the lack of spiritual leaders
available to inmates in France, inmates themselves act as spiritual guides and recruit
other inmates to a form of radical Islam. The drive and commitment to the cause of those
that do choose to participate in violent acts is so powerful that it trumps everything
else.142
Understanding the current French penal system and how France is combatting
radicalization within the system is the next step to understanding how radicals are
recruited. As of 1 January 2016, 66,678 people are serving sentences in prison in France,
and 60% of these prisoners are Muslim.143, 144 Of these Muslims prisoners, 1,400 of them
exhibit extremist behavior.145 The Prime Minster of France, Manuel Valls, explained the
current French policy for combatting these radical Islamic inmates. He stated that these
inmates are separated from the rest, citing a trial program of segregation at a prison south
of Paris at Fresnes.146 The director of the prison, Stéphane Scotto, developed this plan
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after noticing that the number of radical Islamists in the prison increased from twelve in
the summer to twenty in the fall.147 Included in these twenty radicals now living in
isolation is Flavien Moreau, the first French jihadist convicted upon his return from
Syria. Scotto says the trial is showing positive results, stating that it is, “serving to calm
other Muslim prisoners who complained that they felt pressured to behave in a certain
way – praying five times a day, taking down the images of naked women that adorned
their cells, and wearing clothes in the showers.”148 Several counterterrorism experts have
reservations about this plan, though. One source told the French newspaper Le Figaro
that the problem is the lack of resources.149 There is not a person dedicated to the
problem of radicalization in prisons, and there are so many other issues that need to be
addressed. Louis Caprioli, a former French intelligence counter-terrorism chief, stated
that isolating the Islamist prisoners is the problem. He said, “It forms a terrorist cell
within a prison. They come out even more radicalized.”150 The alternative choice,
keeping the Islamist prisoners mixed in with the other inmates, also has negative
consequences. The director of the Quilliam Foundation Haras Rafiq pointed out that the
need for protection can drive inmates into the arms of emirs, who act as heads of Islamic
prison gangs.151 Jean-Charles Brisard, an expert on counter-terrorism, states that those
who convert to radical Islam have “more dangerous profiles” than those who convert
while at liberty.152 This environment makes radicalization easy. Sociologist Farhad
Khosrokhavar explains that young French men embrace the idea of jihad before even
147
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understanding the basic tenets of Islam. He states, “Islam is the only tool they have to
give sacred meaning to their hatred of society. Once they become jihadised, they learn
Islam- and mostly they do it in prison.”153 The unique opportunity that French prisons
give young Muslims results in rampant radicalization to Islamic extremism.

Case Study II
Studying three men who did convert to Islamic radicalization while in prison and
one who did not will assist in understanding how this process works. Both Amedy
Coulibaly and Chérif Kouachi converted to radical Islam while serving time in a French
prison. Karim Mokhtari did not convert, although he was coached to do so. Chérif
Kouachi and his brother Saïd Kouachi were attending Muslim services at a mosque and
receiving counsel from a mentor regularly when Chérif was sent to prison. Djamel
Beghal mentored both Chérif Kouachi and Amedy Coulibaly in the Fleury-Mérogis
prison in 2005. Djamel Beghal was one of Al Qaeda’s top operatives in France, sent to
Paris in order to set up a cell aimed at attacking United States interests there.154 FleuryMérogis is the largest prison in France, and is known for providing little access to imams
or opportunities for Muslim religious services.155 Coulibaly stated, “On a human level, he
is a person who touched me.” They were able to communicate through their cell window,
and Beghal made a lasting impression on Kouachi and Coulibaly. Chérif was released in
2006, and was reunited with his brother Saïd who was also on a path to radical Islam. The
two brothers and their mentor continued communicating over the nine years, including
plans to break the convicted terrorist Smaïn Aït Ali Belkacem out of jail, and trips to
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Yemen. Saïd and Chérif Kouachi and Amedy Coulibaly coordinated the Charlie Hebdo
attacks in Paris in January 2015, which resulted in the death of sixteen people.
Karim Mokhtari was also imprisoned at Fleury-Mérogis. An elderly inmate gave
Mokhtari spiritual guidance when he first arrived at the prison, in an attempt to soothe
Mokhtari’s loneliness.156 After six months, though, the mentor instructed Mokhtari to
“kill infidels” upon his release. Mokhtari resisted the radicalization, and now runs an
organization dedicated to helping young men in prison resist the temptation to convert to
violent extremism.
What is the difference in Coulibaly and Kouachi’s situations and Mokhtari’s? All
three young men had similar backgrounds- born into a lower socio-economic class with
some history of juvenile delinquencies. All three men had some sort of spiritual guide in
the prison trying to convince them to turn to violent extremism after their release.
Coulibaly and Kouachi, though, were influenced by one of Al Qaeda’s top operatives,
and Mokhtari’s mentor was nowhere near as important in the organization. Additionally,
Kouachi had some kind of Muslim background before his prison sentence, while
Mokhtari did not. As the ICJ model of radicalization shows, a spiritual guide is definitely
necessary for prison radicalization to occur, and this case study shows that the more
established the person is the more likely the prisoner will convert.
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Conclusion
This thesis proves that Islamic extremists in France follow the ICJ model of
radicalization, and not the Silber and Bhatt model. It also shows that the social and
religious atmosphere in France creates a unique opportunity for Islamic radicalization.
The process of radicalization involves a turning point in the individual’s life that acts as a
catalyst. In France, the systemic and lawful discrimination of Muslims creates this
catalyst more often than in other countries with different histories and laws. Recruitment
through social media and in prisons is particularly effective in France, because it gives
Muslims a place to connect with extremists. The development of recruitment from the
Internet to social media poses an immense danger because of the prevalence of social
media accounts. Other extremist groups will begin to use these recruitment tactics
because of their recent success. The prison recruitment cycle that has been developed in
France emphasizes the ICJ model’s step of the importance of having a strong leader in
the prison. Looking at the case studies of Amedy Coulibaly, Chérif Kouachi, and Karim
Mokhtari, it is evident that a stronger, more prestigious leader increases the likelihood
that the prisoner will convert to radical Islam.
The radicalization occurring in social media and prisons points to a bigger
problem. The discriminatory laws that the French government enacts foster an
environment that allows non-Muslim French citizens to believe that discrimination is
permissible, and even encouraged. France protects its culture more than any other country
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in the world, and seeks to do so by not allowing Muslims to properly exercise their
religion. This highlights a major disconnect, because many French citizens are Muslim.
Additionally, because of these laws and practices, French Muslims feel that their country
does not support or appreciate them. Being put in jail is the ultimate betrayal for French
Muslims- a country that does not support them uses prison as a form of oppression.
Prison reform is necessary to ensure that recruitment in prisons does not occur. There is
an imminent need for institutional reform in France in order to afford Muslims in France
better opportunities to integrate more fully into society.
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